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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2A-3(2)(j) by
assignment from the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2-2(4).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether the district court properly ruled that plaintiffs claim of promissory

estoppel has no factual basis because plaintiff has admitted that defendant did not make
any promise or commit any action upon which plaintiff relied to plaintiffs detriment and
injury.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Correctness. Blue Cross/Blue Shield v. State, 779

P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989).
Record:

This issue is raised in defendant's Memorandum in support of its

Summary Judgment (R. 250), and decided in favor of defendant (R. 381).
2.

Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiffs

claim of interference with contractual relations or prospective economic relations with a
third-party dealer based on defendant's exercise of its own contractual option to purchase
the third-party dealer's assets, to which plaintiff was not a party.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Correctness. Warren v. Provo City Corporation,

838 P.2d 1125, 1128 (Utah 1992).
Record:

This issue was raised in defendant's Memorandum in support of its

Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 250), and decided in favor of defendant (R. 381).
3.

Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiffs

conspiracy claim when the court held as a matter of law that plaintiff did not have a claim
for any underlying tort or wrongdoing on the part of defendant.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
Record:

Correctness. Id.

This issue was raised in defendant's Memorandum in support of its

Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 250), and decided in favor of defendant (R. 381).
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS
This case is governed by the terms of the Dealer Sales and Service Agreement
between defendant and Helsco, Inc., relevant portions of which are set out in the Addenda
to Brief of Appellant at Tab 1 (R. 017 - 039).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by a current Chevrolet automobile dealer in Ogden, Utah, which
applied for a Dealer Sales and Service Agreement to become a Buick dealer with the
defendant.
The then current Buick dealer submitted a proposal for a change of ownership of
the dealership's assets, first to one person and then to plaintiff. Pursuant to the Dealer
Sales and Service Agreement between defendant and that dealer, to which plaintiff was
not a party, defendant exercised its contractual right of first refusal to purchase the
dealership assets.
When plaintiff submitted its application to become a Buick dealer, plaintiffs
principal knew the possibility that its application to defendant could be rejected. It is
2

admitted by the parties that defendant did not make any promises to plaintiff, nor did
defendant make any comment that would lead plaintiff or its principal to believe that the
application to become a Buick dealer would be accepted. Plaintiff did not lose any money
in the Agreement it or its principal executed with the former dealer. There is no claim of
any out-of-pocket loss to plaintiff at all.
Plaintiffs Complaint alleges three causes of action against defendant from which
it is appealing: (1) promissory estoppel; (2) intentional interference with contractual
relations and future economic relations; and (3) conspiracy.
The Complaint was filed with the Second District Court in 1992. Defendant
moved for summary judgment on undisputed facts. Summary judgment was entered on
April 5? 2000, in favor of the defendant on the three claims for relief, and the appeal was
filed by plaintiff on April 19, 2000. The Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this
Court pursuant to its jurisdiction under U.C.A. § 78-2-2(4).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts were admitted by the plaintiff in the Motion for Summary
Judgment, moving papers, in the pleadings, and in discovery (R. 262-63). Plaintiff did
not have any substantial dispute with any of the facts elicited below.
On February 10, 1990, Helsco, Inc., d/b/a Sierra Buick (hereinafter "Helsco")
entered into a Dealer Sales and Service Agreement (hereinafter "Dealer Agreement")
with defendant for the operation of a Buick dealership in Ogden, Utah (R. 2). Among
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other things, the Dealer Agreement granted defendant a right of first refusal to purchase
the dealership assets in the event Helsco submitted a proposal for change in ownership
(R. 29). The right of first refusal was granted to defendant regardless of whether the
proposed buyer was qualified to be a dealer (R. 29).
In May of 1992, Helsco encountered financial difficulties and "failed to open its
doors for business" according to plaintiffs Complaint (R. 3).
Before it closed its doors, Helsco attempted to sell the dealership assets to Rick
Warner Enterprises. A Buy/Sell Agreement was executed between those two entities on
April 2, 1992 (R. 3). A temporary injunction was obtained by James Whetton, the
predecessor Buick dealer, against Helsco, which prohibited Helsco from selling any of its
assets. As a result, the Helsco-Warner sale was never consummated (R. 3).
Plaintiff owns and operates an automobile dealership also located in Ogden, Utah,
and had and currently has a Dealer Agreement with the Chevrolet Division of this
defendant (R. 1). After the injunction was obtained by Whetton, plaintiff negotiated a
Buy/Sell with Helsco, dated August 31, 1992, wherein plaintiff agreed to purchase the
Buick dealership assets of Helsco. As part of that transaction, plaintiff obtained a
dismissal of the Whetton lawsuits (R. 4).
After the Helsco-plaintiff Buy/Sell Agreement was executed, defendant, at the
request of plaintiff, forwarded the appropriate application documents to plaintiff to
become a Buick dealer/owner/operator (R. 5).
4

On September 1, 1992, plaintiffs principal submitted his application to defendant
to become a Buick dealer/owner/operator in Ogden, Utah (R. 6). On October 15, 1992,
defendant advised Helsco and plaintiff that it was exercising its right of first refusal
pursuant to the Dealer Agreement (R. 6).
Plaintiffs principal understood an existing dealer could not transfer a Dealer
Agreement as part of an asset sale. He understood that defendant could either reject,
accept, or request a modification of the proposal of a new dealer/owner/operator (R. 403,
p. 51).
He was also aware of the possibility that the application could be rejected (R. 403,
51). Plaintiffs principal also admitted that defendant did not in any way indicate to
plaintiff that plaintiffs principal would be a suitable candidate, that his application or
proposal would be accepted, made any comments that would lead him to believe that the
application would be accepted, or, in essence, do anything by way of word or deed to
plaintiff that could be construed as any kind of promise (R. 403, p. 52).
Plaintiff did not lose any money, did not lose any out-of-pocket expense, and did
not change his position by any act of this defendant (R. 403, p. 68).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As to the promissory estoppel claim, defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
was based on the fact that the estoppel claims have no factual assertion based on any
verbal promise, act, or deed by defendant, as admitted by plaintiff, or that plaintiff relied
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on any promise by defendant which induced it to act to its detriment. Plaintiff could not
in the court below establish any promise, any action, or any reliance upon anything that
defendant did upon which a claim for promissory estoppel under Utah law would apply.
As to the claim of intentional or tortious interference with existing contract or
prospective economic advantage, the exercise of this defendant's own contractual rights
with Helsco, to which plaintiff was not a party, is a defense as a matter of law to an action
for tortious interference with contractual rights or other economic relations. The exercise
of a preexisting contractual right, therefore, could not be for an improper purpose or by
improper means, as required under Utah law.
Plaintiffs citation to the United States District Court Opinion ofCrivelli v.
General Motors Corp., 40 F.Supp.2d 639 (W.D. Pa. 1999), is misplaced and misleading,
in that Crivelli was reversed by the Third Circuit on the precise point cited in support of
plaintiffs proposition. Crivelli v. General Motors Corp., 215 F.3d 386 (3d Cir. 2000),
reversing Crivelli v. General Motors Corp., 40 F.Supp.2d 639 (W.D. Pa. 1999). The
reversal and publication of the decision occurred prior to the filing of plaintiff s brief
on appeal to this Court.
Finally, a naked claim of conspiracy without any underlying tort or other
wrongdoing committed by defendant is not actionable as a matter of law.

6

ARGUMENT
I.
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL HAS NO
FACTUAL OR LEGAL BASIS.1
Plaintiffs principal has admitted that he did not rely on any representation of
defendant in executing his agreement with Helsco, and knew at all times that his
application could be refused. Plaintiffs principal further concedes that defendant never
asked plaintiff to take any action with regard to Helsco, or with regard to the lawsuit
brought by Whetton. A promissoiy estoppel claim simply does not exist where there is no
representation by defendant and there is no action taken in reliance thereon.
Promissory estoppel, as pled and construed under Utah law, is an equitable
doctrine which is intended to provide a remedy in the absence of an actual agreement
between the parties concerning the subject matter of the alleged promise. Utah has
adopted the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 90, which recognizes promissory
estoppel as an actionable claim for relief. See Skanchy v. Calcados Ortopesa, 952 P.2d
1071, 1076 (Utah 1998). The Utah Supreme Court has held that to establish a claim for
promissory estoppel, the claimant must demonstrate that: (1) the plaintiff acted with
prudence and in reasonable reliance on a promise made by the defendant; (2) the

Plaintiff has indicated that the first issue presented for review is its promissory
estoppel claim and that its second issue is the intentional interference claim. Plaintiffs
first and second issues are reversed, however, in its argument. Defendant presents the
argument in the same order as the issues presented for review for clarity.
7

defendant knew that the plaintiff had relied on the promise which the defendant should
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the plaintiff or a third
person; (3) the defendant was aware of all material facts; and (4) the plaintiff relied on the
promise and the reliance resulted in a loss to the plaintiff. Id. at 1077; See also, Tolboe
Construction Company v. Stoker Paving and Construction Company, 682 P.2d 843, 84546 (Utah 1984).
In this instance, plaintiff could not establish in the court below any promise, could
not establish any action, and could not establish any reliance. According to plaintiffs
principal's own deposition, Watson admitted that he was well aware of the possibility that
his application to defendant could be rejected. Watson's communication with defendant's
Zone Manager, the only person to whom he spoke concerning his application, did not in
any way indicate to Watson that he would be a suitable candidate or that his application or
proposal would be accepted. Watson further admitted that defendant did not in any way
request Watson, or Helsco, for that matter, to do anything at all.
Plaintiff cites the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 59 [sic], and § 161 for the
proposition that nondisclosure may have the effect of a misrepresentation. Sections 159
and 161 relate to what constitutes a misrepresentation in connection with contract
formation and the good faith necessary in the bargaining process of contract formation.
There is no claim here that there was any contract at issue between plaintiff and
defendant, or any contract formation that is relevant to the contract at issue: the one
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between plaintiff and Helsco. There is simply no misrepresentation or nondisclosure
issue applicable to this factual situation.
As to its promissory estoppel claim, plaintiff can only contend that it undertook
certain actions with the former Buick dealer in connection with the Whetton TRO, in the
hope of obtaining a Buick Dealer Sales and Service Agreement while admittedly knowing
that there was a possibility that it would not occur. Even if Watson believed his
application would be approved, the doctrine of promissory estoppel requires more than
the party's subjective understanding of conversations or events. It certainly requires more
than subjective hope. Indeed, in Larson v. Wycoff Company, 624 P.2d 1151 (Utah 1981),
the Court held that a party claiming an estoppel could not rely on representations or acts if
they are contrary to his own knowledge of truth. Here, plaintiff has conceded that there is
no factual basis for its claim. The trial court's summary judgment order should be
affirmed.
II.
DEFENDANT DID NOT INTERFERE WITH THE BUY/SELL
AGREEMENT BETWEEN WATSON AND HELSCO. BECAUSE
DEFENDANT'S EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL
IS EXPRESSLY PERMITTED UNDER A CONTRACT TO WHICH
PLAINTIFF IS NOT A PARTY.
Plaintiff asserted in the court below, and asserts here, that defendant tortiously
interfered in the contract between Watson and Helsco because it purportedly violated the
Utah Automobile Franchise Act, stating that consent to the transfer of any ownership or
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interest shall not be unreasonably withheld, and citing the United States District Court
Opinion of Crivelliv. General Motors Corp., 40 F.Supp.2d 639 (W.D. Pa. 1999).
Plaintiffs argument is wrong as a matter of law, and the authority it cites has been
reversed. Crivelli v. General Motors Corp., 215 F.3d 386 (3d Cir. 2000).
First, Utah Code Ann. § 13-14-3, the Utah Automobile Franchise Act, which
plaintiff mistakenly relies upon, is for the exclusive benefit of an existing franchisee of an
existing franchise under the Statute:
Notwithstanding the terms of any new motor vehicle franchise, no
franchisor shall terminate or refuse to continue any existing franchise unless
(1) the franchisee has received written notice from the franchisor as
follows: . . . (b) fifteen days before the effective date thereof setting forth
the specific grounds with respect to any of the following: (a) transfer of any
ownership or interest in the franchise without the consent of the franchisor,
which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.
As this language makes clear, the statute is for the benefit of the existing
franchisee, not for the benefit of any prospective franchisee. In this instance, the existing
franchisee was not terminated, and he is not the one who is complaining. As numerous
courts have determined, a disappointed applicant for a dealership does not have standing
to assert a claim for a purported violation of the transfer provision of a state dealer law.
See, e.g., Pungv. General Motors Corp., 573 N.W.2d 80 (Mich.Ct.App. 1998); Roberts v.
General Motors Corp., 643 A.2d 956 (N.H. 1994); Blair v. General Motors Corp., 838
F.Supp. 1196(W.D.Ky. 1993); Beard v. Toyota Motor Distributors,//7C, 480N.E.2d 303
(Mass. 1985).
10

Second, plaintiff does not purport to bring an action under the Utah Automobile
Franchise Act in its Complaint. Third, any relief afforded under the Utah Automobile
Franchise Act is specifically delineated in Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-14-7 and 13-14-8,
permitting courts merely to enjoin violations of certain notice requirements under Utah
Code Ann. § 13-14-5. In short, reliance upon the Utah Act is misplaced, not pled,
provides no relief, and plaintiff has no standing in any event to plead it or seek relief
under it.
In the case upon which plaintiff principally relies, Crivelli v. General Motors
Corp., 40 F.Supp.2d 639 (W.D. Pa. 1999), the district court construed a provision of
the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles Act which provided that it is a violation of
Pennsylvania law to "unreasonably withhold consent to the sale, transfer, exchange of the
franchise to a qualified buyer capable of being licensed as a new vehicle dealer in this
Commonwealth" (citing 63 P.S. § 818.9). The Utah Automobile Franchise Act had no
such provision.
Further, the District Court opinion in Crivelli was reversed by the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals on the precise point for which it was cited prior to the filing of
plaintiffs brief on June 14, 2000, in Crivelliv. General Motors Corp., 215 F.3d 386 (3d
Cir. 2000). In the Third Circuit Opinion, the Court was construing the identical provision
of defendant's right of first refusal that defendant had with Helsco in the present case.
The Court noted that defendant expressly retained the right of first refusal at its sole
11

discretion, so long as it matched the purchase price, and met the other terms of a bona
fide buy/sell agreement. It had been plaintiffs argument in the Third Circuit that
notwithstanding this provision in the contract, defendant's exercise of its right of first
refusal was subject to the reasonableness standard of the Pennsylvania Automobile
Franchise Act. The Third Circuit, however, held that a manufacturer had an absolute
right to exercise the right of first refusal option it had with the third-party dealer and had
no obligation to approve or even consider the agreement between that third-party dealer
and the new applicant:
Crivelli offers no explanation why the Pennsylvania legislature would turn
away from the common law principle of freedom of contract and impose a
reasonableness standard on aspects of a private contract between the
manufacturer and dealer that, like the exercise of a right of first refusal,
presents little, if any, likelihood of harm to the dealer.
215F.3dat392.
The Third Circuit also distinguished its decision in Big Apple BMW, Inc., v. BMW
of North Am., Inc., 91A F.2d 1358 (3d Cir. 1992), another case upon which plaintiff relies.
The Third Circuit distinguished its opinion in Big Apple because the franchisor in that
case "did not assert a contractual right of first refusal whereas here GM asserted a bona
fide right of first refusal designed to protect its interest in its franchise." 215 F.3d at 395.
Whatever argument plaintiff attempts to make under the Utah Franchise Act, the
citation to the lower court opinion in Crivelli and its citation to Big Apple, as can be seen,
is misplaced and misleading. It should be rejected here.
12

Plaintiff further argues that defendant, by soliciting a future buyer if defendant
exercised its contractual right of first refusal, engaged in conduct that was somehow
wrongful. That argument is clearly wrong. It is well established in Utah that the exercise
of a legal right is a defense to an action for tortious interference with contractual rights or
other economic relations:
It is also generally recognized that even though a defendant's action brings
about a breach of contract, he is not liable where the breach was caused by
the doing of an act which he had a legal right to do. This rule is applied by
Prosser in his Law of Torts, page 737, Sec. 106, as follows:
If (defendant) has a present, existing economic interest to
protect, such as the ownership or condition of property, or a
prior contract of his own, or a financial interest in the affairs
of the person persuaded, he is privileged to prevent
performance of the contract of another which threatens it. . .
Brummelv. Bills, 368 P.2d 597, 602-603 (1962).
Plaintiffs citation of Leigh Furniture and Carpet Company v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293
(Utah 1982), is also of no aid to plaintiff. Leigh Furniture requires plaintiff, in order to
prove a prima facie case for tortious interference, to establish that defendant committed
an intentional interference for an "improper purpose" or by "improper means."
Defendant could not have used improper means by exercising its own right of first refusal
contained in the contractual language between Helsco and itself. As explained in
Coronado Mining Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 577 P.2d 957 (Utah 1978), a defendant
who has a present, existing economic interest to protect, such as a prior contract of his

13

own, or a financial interest in the affairs of the person persuaded, is privileged to prevent
performance of the contract of another which threatens it. A contractual right of first
refusal presupposes a subsequent contractual proposal between the existing dealer and a
third party. Exercising a contractual right, without more, is clearly not improper means.
According to Utah law, improper means is present only "where the means used to
interfere with a party's economic relations are contrary to law, such as violations of
statutes, regulations, or recognized common-law rules." St. Benedict's Co. v.
St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991), citing Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co.
v. horn, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982). The court in St Benedict's further stated that
improper means includes "violence, threat or other intimidation, deceit or other
misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigation, defamation, or disparaging falsehood."
As can be seen, exercising a contractual right is not the type of improper means that the
Utah courts were referring to in Leigh Furniture or in St. Benedict's.
Improper purpose likewise is not present as a matter of law. Improper purpose,
according to the Utah Supreme Court, is "established by a showing that the actor's
predominant purpose was to injure the plaintiff.... An immediate intent to injure a
competitor may be motivated and outweighed by a legitimate long-range interest in
furthering one's own economic condition." St. Benedict's Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital,
811 P.2d 194, 201. There is absolutely no showing here as a matter of law that
defendant's predominant purpose was to injure plaintiff. That assertion is absurd. Even
14

plaintiff acknowledges that the exercise of first refusal rights was to further defendant's
own business plan, not to injure plaintiff. [Appellant's Brief at 17.]
In Crivelli, cited supra, the Third Circuit also addressed whether the exercise of a
contractual right of first refusal in construing the same contract which is at issue here can
constitute intentional interference. The Court specifically held that this exercise cannot
ordinarily give rise to a claim of intentional interference construing Pennsylvania law
which had adopted the Restatement elements of the tort as well as Kansas law and New
York law. While Utah has adopted the Oregon approach to the tort of intentional
interference as opposed to the Restatement approach, the same factor is determinative:
was the nature of the defendant's conduct improper. The Crivelli Court held that exercise
of a preexisting contractual right is not comparable to the type of conduct previously
found actionable under the Restatement approach as well as the Utah approach (threats of
physical violence, fraudulent misrepresentations, economic pressure, etc.). 215 F.3d at
395. The Court stated:
The conduct Crivelli attacks by its tort claim, GM's decision to exercise its
right of first refusal, is not comparable to any of these examples and, as we
have just decided, violated no statute, regulation, or governing judicial
decision.
Id.
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Defendant's exercise of its preexisting contractual rights cannot support a claim of
tortious interference here. The trial court's ruling was correct as a matter of law. It
should be affirmed.
III.

THE NAKED CONSPIRACY THEORY FAILS AS A MATTER OF
LAW.
Despite its failure to state a substantive claim for relief, plaintiff attempts to hold
onto its conspiracy claim. The question becomes, a conspiracy to commit what unlawful
act? Plaintiff failed to answer that question in the court below, and still has not answered
it here on appeal.
Because plaintiffs predicate claims are without merit, its conspiracy claim also
fails. In Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785 (Utah App. 1987), cert, denied,
111 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1989), the Utah Court of Appeals states:
To assert civil conspiracy, plaintiff m u s t . . . prove that the alleged
conspirators performed one or more unlawful, overt acts. If the object of
the alleged conspiracy or the means used to attain it is lawfiil, even if
damage results to plaintiff or defendant acted with a malicious motive, there
can be no civil action for conspiracy. "If such were not the rule, obviously
many purely business dealings would give rise to an action in tort on behalf
of one who may have been adversely affected."
746 P.2d at 792 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
That is the exact situation before the Court here: a legitimate business decision,
which may have "adversely affected" the plaintiff, does not support a conspiracy claim.

16

The trial court correctly ruled that defendant is entitled to summary judgment on
plaintiffs conspiracy claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Summary Judgment granted in favor of defendant
and against plaintiff should be affirmed.
DATED this H ~ day of December, 2000.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

R. Brent Stephens
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
N\5263\174\MC\BRIEF 1
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